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Dynamicism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Dynamicism, also termed dynamic hypothesis or dynamic cognition, is an approach in cognitive science popularized by the work of philosopher Tim van Gelder.[1][2] It argues that differential equations and dynamical systems are more suited to modeling cognition rather than the commonly used ideas of symbolicism, connectionism, or traditional computer models.[3] [4] It is closely related to dynamical neuroscience.

References

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  1. ^ Tim, van Gelder (1995), "What might cognition be, if not computation?", The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (7): 345–381, doi:10.2307/2941061, JSTOR 2941061
  2. ^ Tim, van Gelder (October 1998), "The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21 (5): 615–628, doi:10.1017/S0140525X98001733, PMID 10097022
  3. ^ Eliasmith, Chris (1996-12-01). "The third contender: A critical examination of the Dynamicist theory of cognition". Philosophical Psychology. 9 (4): 441–463. doi:10.1080/09515089608573194. ISSN 0951-5089.
  4. ^ Zednik, Carlos (2009), "The Varieties of Dynamicism", Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 31